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Erste Kommentare zum geplanten US-Teilrückzug aus Afghanistan von Thomas Ruttig, bei CSIS, Long War Journal, Telepolis, New York Times, TOLOnews und anderen

Veröffentlicht von: Nachtwei am 23. Dezember 2018 14:44:27 +02:00 (10249 Aufrufe)

Nach der Ankündigung des Truppenabzuges der USA aus Syrien meldeten Wall Street Journal u.a., dass auch ein Teilrückzug der US-Truppen aus Afghanistan geplant sei. Dazu Kommentare von Thomas Ruttig, dem besten deutschen Afghanistan-Kenner, von A. Cordeman/CSIS, auf Long War Journal, Telepolis, New York Times und TOLOnews. 

US-Teilabzuges aus Afghanistan von/auf

Thomas Ruttig, CSIS, LWJ, Telepolis, New York Times, TOLOnews, FAZ, Tagesspiegel

W.Nachtwei, 23./28.12.2018

(1) Kommentar zum US-Teilabzug aus Afghanistan von Thomas Ruttig,

dem erfahrensten und besten Afghanistan-Kenner in Deutschland,

in der Online-taz vom 21.12.2018 (am 24.12. in der Druckausgabe)

Keine Politik, nur noch Ressentiment

Inoffiziell ist der Teilabzug aus Afghanistan bereits beschlossen. So schwächt Trump die eigene Position und die seiner lokalen Verbündeten

Nun ist es wohl passiert, schneller als erwartet: US-Offizielle bestätigen bereits anonym, Trumps Entscheidung über einen Truppenteilabzug aus Afghanistan – bis zur Hälfte der etwa 14.000 Soldaten – sei gefallen. Also: Erst der Abzug aus den Kurdengebieten in Syrien, wo die Kurden Assad und Erdogan zum Fraß vorgeworfen werden, und jetzt Afghanistan. Trump übersetzt seine America-First-Politik ins Außenressort, ohne Rücksicht auf Verbündete.

Nicht dass so etwas zum ersten Mal geschieht: Bush Senior, nach seinem Ableben gerade noch von der Tagesschau als „einer der außenpolitisch erfolgreichsten US-Präsidenten“ gepriesen, opferte Iraks aufständische Schiiten und Kurden Saddam Hussain. Auch die Afghaninnen und Afghanen sind ja schon einmal vom gesamten Westen im Stich gelassen worden, nach dem Abzug der damals sowjetischen Invasoren 1989.

Über ein paar Zwischenstufen führte das zur Herrschaft der rückwärtsgewandten, misogynen, menschenrechts- und demokratiefeindlichen Taliban. Während das hierzulande weitgehend vergessen ist, ging es in die afghanische nationale Erzählung ein. Der mögliche Beginn des amerikanischen Afghanistan-Rückzugs wird ihnen einen Schauer den Rücken hinunter jagen.

Politisch-strategisch passt selbst ein Teilabzug jetzt überhaupt nicht. Immerhin hat Trump gerade einen Sonderbeauftragten geschickt, mit den Taliban ein Ende des Kriegs und – dann! – einen Truppenabzug herbei zu verhandeln. So aber schwächt Trump deutlich die eigene Position und die seiner lokalen Verbündeten bzw. Klienten.

Vergurkt haben es die Amerikaner

Das ist keine Politik, nur noch Ressentiment. Man erinnere sich an seine Vor-Wahl-Tweets: „Unsere Truppen werden von den Afghanen getötet. Wir vergeuden dort Milliarden. Wir bauen Straßen und Schulen für Leute, die uns hassen.“ Seine „Intuition“ lege ihm einen Abzug nahe. Das ist natürlich alles grob vereinfacht. Vergurkt haben das die Amerikaner mit ihrer Besatzermentalität.

Die Afghanen werden es ausbaden müssen. Wie wird ihre Zukunft aussehen? Ein Neo-Taliban-Regime, eventuell verstärkt durch die Seiten wechselnde Warlords, die ebenfalls größtenteils Islamisten sind? Fraktions- oder Bürgerkrieg, 1990er reloaded? Oder beides, je nach Gegend? Wenn die Taliban Champagner trinken würden, könnten sie jetzt die Flaschen entkorken.

http://www.taz.de/Kommentar-US-Teilabzug-aus-Afghanistan/!5561713/

(2)Trumps Truppenabzugsbeschluss: Afghanistan fallenlassen, die zweite

Der gegenüber der Online-taz deutlich erweiterte Kommentar von Thomas Ruttig am 21.12.

https://thruttig.wordpress.com/2018/12/21/trumps-truppenabzugsbeschluss-afghanistan-fallenlassen-die-zweite/

(3) Losing on All Fronts: The Mattis Resignation and Trump’s Failed Strategies for America’s Wars

By Anthony H. Cordesman, 20.12.2018, Center for Strategic & International Studies/CSIS, Washington  ( https://www.csis.org/analysis/losing-all-fronts-mattis-resignation-and-trumps-failed-strategies-americas-wars )

(…) The President's decision to withdraw half of the roughly 16,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan will make it impossible to carry out an effective train and assist program for Afghan forces and check the Taliban. Coupled to U.S. peace negotiations that come perilously close to declaring victory and leaving, and a lack of U.S. effort to persuade Afghanistan to hold meaningful Presidential elections to unify the country, it may well turn an uncertain war of attrition into the same kind of defeat the U.S. suffered in Vietnam. (…)

The Broader Strategic Challenge of America's Ongoing Wars

In fairness, President Trump's recent actions are scarcely responsible for the fact U.S. strategy range from failed to flawed in all its wars before he even took office. The crisis President Trump has now triggered by announcing sudden force reductions in Syria and Afghanistan is only part of the much broader failure to develop effective U.S. strategies for any of America's present wars that had its beginnings at the start of the Afghan and Iraq wars in 2001 and 2003.

(…)

At the same time, his critics do need to acknowledge that they only compound much broader and costly strategic failures that are the result of actions taken by President Bush and President Obama. President Trump did not create the lack of any U.S. effective strategy in fighting and ending America's wars. The younger President Bush invaded Afghanistan after 9/11 without a clear strategy for ensuring the final defeat of the Taliban, and failed to either create a stable new Afghan government economy or check Pakistani interference. He invaded Iraq with no plan to stabilize the country after the fall of Saddam Hussein and mismanaged the post-invasion effort so badly he created a whole new threat of Sunni Islamic extremists while opening the country up to Iran. (…)

President Obama did no better. He failed to keep an effective U.S. presence in Iraq, sustained a meaningful civil-stability effort, and left Iraq's Prime Minister Maliki to create new sectarian and ethnic tensions that opened up Iraq and Syria to ISIS and the still ongoing war to defeat it. He failed to intervene in Syria when a limited push could have removed Assad, failed to enforce his own red line against the use of chemical weapons, and failed to react when Iran, Hezbollah, and then Russia intervened. He set impossible goals for withdrawal from Afghanistan, and then failed to deploy effective levels of force when his withdrawal plans decisively failed.

As a result, a President with almost no real foreign policy and military background and experience has inherited a climate of bipartisan strategic failure in the Iraq/Syria war, the Afghan War, and some seven much smaller U.S. military interventions from Africa to Asia, as well as having to deal with successful Iranian intervention in Syria and Iraq, as well as the all too many areas where Arab divisiveness and self-destructiveness has opened up the Middle East to Iranian intervention.

In fairness to President Trump, no one can ignore his emphasis on the cost and casualties in any of America's wars. The latest publically available Cost of War report issued by the Department of Defense indicates the total direct cost of America's wars since 2010 will be $1.77 trillion by the end of FY2018 – with $756 billion for Iraq and Syria and $730 billion for Afghanistan and a large amount of support for both wars and other costs. The State Department has never provided a credible costing of its part of the fighting, but it probably adds another $127-$132 billion.

Even if one ignores civilian and allied casualties, the Department of Defense reports that there were 6,978 US military dead. 5,434 killed in combat, and 52,783 wounded between 2010 and December 19, 2018. Far too many of those wounded will continue to suffer and need continuing medical care for all of their lives.

The Broader Strategic Challenge in Afghanistan

The Afghan conflict raises similar concerns about the present Trump policies and strategy. President Trump certainly made things worse by seeming to react to the criticisms in Secretary Mattis' letter of resignation by suddenly announcing that he would cut the U.S. presence by some 7,000 uniformed military out of a total of some 14,000.

However, months before this announcement, the U.S. seemed to be pursuing a strategy in Afghanistan at the political level that was all too close to the U.S. strategy that led to the collapse of South Vietnam. Despite Secretary Mattis' efforts to build-up the U.S. train and assist force, add 4,000 personnel, and expand its mission, the Trump Administration began to pursue a separate peace policy. It increasingly seemed to be negotiating with the Taliban in ways where it could at least claim it had reach a "peace" and then withdraw.

Even more than the Obama Administration, the Trump Administration largely ignored the critical civil dimension of the war, and the need to give Afghanistan effective political and economic support. It had no clear plan for creating an effective Afghan government. It also had no credible plan for finishing the job that the Obama Administration had botched earlier in seeking to create Afghan forces that could stand on their own.

The Afghan government remains a divided, corrupt, and ineffective mess, and often is more the government of "Kabulstan" than the nation of Afghanistan. In spite of real anti-corruption efforts by President Ghani, Transparency International still ranks Afghanistan as the 4th most corrupt country in the world out of the 180 countries it ranks.

The election that left Ashraf Ghani as President and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah as CEO created a leadership that is not functional enough to meet Afghan needs on either a civil or warfighting level. The Afghan legislature lacks the unity, authority, and control over money to be effective. Yet, the U.S. seems to be negotiating with the Taliban in ways that could block or further delay an Afghan presidential election that might provide a single leader with real political credibility – an option even worse than the stage-managed elections in South Vietnam.

Afghanistan faces critical civil problems. Flight to the cities, rising poverty, massive unemployment, corruption at every level, divisions between power brokers and de facto warlords, a brain drain to other countries, and growing dependence on a narco-economy all offset the areas where Afghanistan is making civil progress. As the CIA notes,

"Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs. Corruption, insecurity, weak governance, lack of infrastructure, and the Afghan Government's difficulty in extending rule of law to all parts of the country pose challenges to future economic growth. Afghanistan's living standards are among the lowest in the world. Since 2014, the economy has slowed, in large part because of the withdrawal of nearly 100,000 foreign troops that had artificially inflated the country’s economic growth.

The United States is also negotiating with the Taliban at a time when the Taliban is refusing to deal with the Afghan government, focuses on demands that the U.S. and NATO leave the country, and is confident of victory. This confidence is not without cause.

The Taliban seems to be slowly winning its battle of attrition with Afghan forces despite the fact that the U.S. has increased some aspects of its train and assist effort and will probably drop nearly 50% more air weapons in 2018 than it did in 2017 (6,584 strike sorties through October 31, 2018 vs. 4,603 in all of 2017 or 43% increase; 5,982 weapons dropped through October 31, 2018 vs. 4,361 in all of 2017 or 37% increase).

While Afghan government casualty levels are classified, the Afghan forces now seem to be suffering from unacceptable levels of killed and wounded –with some 25,000 dead in recent years –much higher numbers of wounded, and the same critical desertion problems that undermined the ARVN at the end of the Vietnam War.

Here, the Department of Defense is partly at fault for concealing the level of these problems. More and more of its reporting seems to either ignore the war or spin its contents to avoid honestly reporting on the growth of Taliban and other extremist influence, and the problems Afghan forces are encountering. It is doing so in ways all too similar to the "follies" in Vietnam.

There seem to be serious differences in the Department of Defense view of the war and that of the CIA. Independent official analyses like those of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the Lead Inspector General raise serious questions about the course of the fighting, the steady growth of Taliban control and influence in new areas, and progress of Afghan forces if the United States does not provide sustained support.

Key outside analyses like those of the Long War Journal – and most media reporting – also raise similar or much greater doubts about what will happen if the U.S. should now agree to the wrong kind of peace, fail to provide years of economic aid and support to Afghan forces, and rush out as it did in Vietnam.

There is a desperate need to seek peace in Afghanistan, but it must be a real peace, and one that leaves a legitimate government in charge – not the Taliban. The President's sudden cut of U.S. forces in Afghanistan now leaves the Taliban with no incentive to negotiate, and a near assurance of winning a war of attrition over time. The Trump Administration would have to make far greater concessions now to have any chance of persuading the Taliban, concessions that would amount to declaring victory in ways that clearly meant defeat. Even before such cuts, however, the odds of success were terrible. Vietnam is scarcely the only case in point illustrating how a fragile or false peace can produce the wrong results. The outcome of peace negotiations in Nepal and Cambodia are further examples as to just how easily peace negotiations can become an extension of war by other means.

Some of the blame does have to go to the Afghans, and President Trump is right in one key respect. The U.S cannot support Afghanistan indefinitely. The U.S. has no responsibility to continue to do so if the Afghans again fail to elect an effective government, if they fail to develop their forces over a reasonable period, or do not reduce corruption and if they make the necessary reforms.

Declaring peace and abandoning Afghanistan, however, is no substitute for only being willing to agreeing to the right kind of peace, and for continuing to provide kind of military and economic aid that Afghanistan needs to have a meaningful chance. So far, there is far too little evidence that this is the strategy that the Trump Administration is now willing to pursue.
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant on Afghanistan to the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State.

Downloads

Download "Losing on All Fronts: The Failed Trump Strategies for America's Wars"

(4)Analysis: The costs of withdrawal from Afghanistan

By Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, Long War Jounal, December 21, 2018

First it was Syria, then came Afghanistan. Two days ago, President Trump shocked the foreign policy community by announcing the withdrawal of US troops from Syria, wrongly claiming the Islamic State has been defeated. Within the last 24 hours, reports have emerged that the US military will quickly pull nearly half of its forces from Afghanistan, and likely withdraw the rest by the end of 2019.

Trump’s decision is unsurprising to us. We’ve reported since October that the order to withdraw from Afghanistan could come at any time.

Many are celebrating the move, pointing to the length of the conflict (17 years), the enormous sunk cost and the inability of the Afghan government to stand on its own. Careful readers of this website will note that we have been critical of the war effort, and especially the rosy rhetoric employed by US military officials. We could easily pen another biting critique of the US-led war.

More troubling to us than a so-called “endless war,” however, is an outright jihadist victory. And that’s what Trump’s withdrawal of the small American force in country all but guarantees. (…)

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/12/analysis-the-costs-of-withdrawal-from-afghanistan.php

(5) Afghanistan: USA im Rückwärtsgang

22. Dezember 2018 Thomas Pany , Telepolis, https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Afghanistan-USA-im-Rueckwaertsgang-4258677.html

(Differenzierte Zusammenfassung und Einordnung der Kommentare von Thomas Ruttig und Long War Jornal)

(6) In Afghanistan, Alarm and a Sense of Betrayal Over U.S. Drawdown

By Mujib Mashal, Dec. 21, 2018, 

( https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/21/world/asia/afghanistan-troops-pullout.html )

KABUL, Afghanistan — Last year, when President Trump announced a new strategy 16 years into the Afghan war, many in Afghanistan saw it as a much-needed refocusing of the American commitment.

“Conditions on the ground — not arbitrary timetables — will guide our strategy from now on,” Mr. Trump said at the time. “America’s enemies must never know our plans or believe they can wait us out.”

In the year since then, as the architects of that strategy have exited the administration one by one, many in Afghanistan came to believe that Mr. Trump — who never met with his former top commander in the country — had never really been persuaded, and that his impatience with the war was winning out.

On Friday, that suspicion seemed to be confirmed, as Afghan officials and Western diplomats woke to the unexpected news that Mr. Trump had ordered half of the 14,000 American troops in Afghanistan home, even as the war continues to rage and the Taliban threaten much of the country.

For many in the Afghan leadership, shock quickly turned to a sense of betrayal.

Most officials and diplomats said they would only speak on condition of anonymity because they were still assessing the situation. But many were less concerned about the reduction in troop numbers — though struggling Afghan forces still need hands-on help — than by the way news of it emerged, which they said appeared to undermine not only the Afghan government, but also some of the most senior American officials working for a peace deal.

Afghan officials said they had not been consulted or even warned about the drawdown. And the timing was likely to complicate the American push for peace talks with the Taliban, which requires maintaining pressure, or at least holding the line, on the battlefield.

Just this week, senior American diplomats had conducted two days of extensive talks with representatives of the insurgency, with the future of the United States military presence among the topics discussed. And hours before the troop pulldown became public knowledge, Zalmay Khalilzad, the most senior American diplomat involved in the talks, said he had made it clear to the Taliban that the American commitment was firm.

The decision also comes at a time when the American military already has a trust deficit with its Afghan partners after a spate of recent insider attacks. A feeling of abandonment could further increase the risk to soldiers working closely with Afghan partners.

Under the right circumstances, an American troop reduction could be a boon to peace talks — a demonstration to the Taliban that the United States is willing to do what is necessary to reach a deal.

“It’s clear that a rapid pullout of all international forces could spark the collapse of the Afghan government and start a new civil war,” said Graeme Smith, a consultant with the International Crisis Group and a longtime observer of Afghanistan. “Still, this partial withdrawal could send a useful message to all sides. This signals to the Taliban that the U.S. is serious about negotiating an exit.”

But the surprise nature of the move, coming before the Taliban had indicated any willingness to hold formal talks with Afghan officials or agree to a cease-fire, suggested it was unlikely to have been coordinated with the recent peace moves, and that it could in fact undermine the negotiators.

Afghan leaders who have met with Mr. Khalilzad about the talks said he expressed a sense of urgency, warning that Mr. Trump might take unilateral action if there were no breakthrough on peace talks.

But the officials said Mr. Khalilzad seemed to believe he had months to push for that breakthrough, and that he was unlikely to have known what was coming.

Publicly, President Ashraf Ghani’s office played down the significance of the troop reduction, saying that the Afghan forces had weathered such storms before, notably the first drastic withdrawal of American troops in 2014.

“If the few thousand foreign troops that advise, train and assist leave, it will not affect our security,” Mr. Ghani’s chief adviser, Fazel Fazly, said in a statement. “In the past four and half years, our security is completely in the hands of Afghans, and the final goal is that Afghan national defense and security forces will stand on their feet to protect and defend our people and soil on their own.”

In private, however, officials’ views ranged from a sense of betrayal to fear of outright chaos.

The Taliban clearly welcomed the news. A senior member of the insurgency said the drawdown was a sign that Mr. Trump realized negotiations were the only way to end the conflict.

In neighboring Pakistan, which the United States sees as crucial to ending the war because its military has long given sanctuary to Taliban leaders, officials said they, too, had been surprised by the announcement. They expressed concern about how it could affect the push for peace talks, and about whether a premature withdrawal could lead to the kind of chaos that followed the Soviet Union’s pullout from Afghanistan in the late 1980s.

A senior Pakistani security official said the American withdrawal should be phased and should ensure that Afghanistan’s military and government can sustain themselves.

Much of the feeling of betrayal on the part of Afghan officials stems from the fact that they pinned significant hope on Mr. Trump’s new strategy, staking political capital at home and risking anger in the region.

The strategy, announced as the Taliban were making a serious push for cities and other territory across the country, promised the Afghan government expanded resources, as well as pressure on Pakistan’s military to stop harboring Taliban leaders.

The Afghan government saw it as just the boost it needed in the face of panic. And for American generals and soldiers on the ground, it suggested a long-term commitment. Several Marines who had just returned to Helmand Province, once a site of bloody battles for them, said they now saw the war as “a generational conflict” — one in which their children would probably serve.

Mohammad Radmanish, a retired Afghan general and defense analyst, said the drawdown would not make a big difference on the battlefield.

“After 2014, they are here to support, train and advise the Afghan forces,” Mr. Radmanish said of the Americans. “It is the Afghan forces who are doing the fighting against the terrorists.”

But officers who were still in the fight expressed serious concern.

“If the forces leave here and leave us alone, it will be a dangerous blow and will have very negative consequences,” said Maj. Mohammed Ali Ahmadi, the commander of the Afghan commando battalion in the northeast. “We don’t have the proper capabilities to defend the areas, particularly the areas where the security forces are under grave threat. It will not be fair to us.”

Reporting was contributed by Fatima Faizi from Kabul, Taimoor Shah from Kandahar, and Najim Rahim from Kunduz. Salman Masood contributed reporting from Islamabad, Pakistan, and Maria Abi-Habib from Dhaka, Bangladesh.

A version of this article appears in print on Dec. 22, 2018, on Page A6 of the New York edition with the headline: In Afghanistan, Alarm and a Sense of Betrayal by the U.S.. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

(7) Troop Withdrawal Will Not Affect Security: Ghani’s Spokesman

TOLOnews 21.12.2018, https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/troop-withdrawal-will-not-affect-security-ghani%E2%80%99s-spokesman

Chakhansuri says a significant number of the US forces, who will possibly be withdrawn, are engaged in training and advise mission for Afghan forces.

The reports on a possible withdrawal of a significant number of US forces from Afghanistan made headlines in national and international levels; however, President Ashraf Ghani’s spokesman said that a reduction in number of the troops will not affect the security of the country.

“The concerns circulating in mass media on the future of Afghanistan, were spreading much more than this in 2014,” President Ghani’s spokesman Haroon Chakhansuri said in a social media message on Friday. 

He said “many analysts were warning that if the 100,000 plus foreign forces leave Afghanistan, the country will fall; however, our brave National Defense and Security Forces proved this wrong by making sacrifices and defended the country and the people with courage”.

“If they withdraw from Afghanistan it will not have a security impact because in the last four and a half years Afghan forces have been in full control,” Chakhansuri said.

Chakhansuri said most of the US forces – who will possibly be withdrawn from Afghanistan - are engaged in training and advise mission for Afghan forces and that Afghan forces are capable of defending the country.

Reports by US media indicate that Trump administration has ordered the US military to start withdrawing up to 7,000 troops from Afghanistan in the coming months.

In a report published on December 20, The New York Times quotes a US official wo says that Mr. Trump made the decision to pull the troops — about half the number the United States has in Afghanistan now — at the same time he decided to pull American forces out of Syria.

On Thursday, the US Defense Secretary James Mattis announced that he would resign from his position at the end of February after disagreeing with President Trump over his approach to policy in the Middle East.

The Wall Street Journal was the first to report the development.

The New York Times quotes another US official who says the reduction of forces in Afghanistan is in an effort to make Afghan forces more reliant on their own troops and not Western support.

According to The New York Times, Cmdr. Rebecca Rebarich, a Pentagon spokeswoman, declined to comment on the plan to remove troops from Afghanistan.

The US troops in Afghanistan are divided between training and advising Afghan forces and a counterterror mission.

According to the report, those who are part of the 7,000-troop withdrawal will be a mixture of forces from both of those missions.

This comes amid increasing efforts by the Afghan government and its international allies, US on the top, to reach a political settlement for ending the war in Afghanistan.

In line with these efforts, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, met with Afghan government leaders, political leaders and activists in Kabul to discuss the Afghan peace.

In an interview with TOLOnews on Thursday, Khalilzad said Taliban has accepted that they cannot win by warfare and that political settlement should be sought for ending the crisis in the country.

(8) Wer verteidigt jetzt unsere Sicherheit am Hindukusch?

Ohne amerikanischen Schutz wäre die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan ziemlich wehrlos – die Zukunft des Einsatzes soll völlig offen sein.

Von Peter Carstens und Christiann Meyer, FAZ 24.12.2018, akzialusiet 26.12., https://www.faz.net/2.1677/bundeswehr-in-afghanistan-ohne-amerikas-schutz-wehrlos-15957588.html

(9) Welche Folgen hätte ein Teilabzug der USA aus Afghanistan?

Es deutet einiges darauf hin, dass US-Präsident Donald Trump die US-Truppen in Afghanistan deutlich reduziert. Das hätte Konsequenzen auch für die Bundeswehr. Stephan Haselberger Albrecht Meier Paul Starzmann , Tagesspiegel 26.12.2018, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/us-aussenpolitik-unter-donald-trump-welche-folgen-haette-ein-teilabzug-der-usa-aus-afghanistan/23799292.html 

(10) Was ein US-Abzug für Afghanistan bedeutet, Felix Hackenbruch, Tagesspiegel 28,12.2018 (mit Grünen Stimmen)

ANHANG:

Auszug aus meinem Jahresrückblick 2018, Teil zu Afghanistan

(http://nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&aid=1564 )

An Afghanistan versuche ich dranzubleiben, auch wenn die Informationslage schwieriger, die „Nachfrage“ sehr zurückgegangen und die Konkurrenz anderer wichtiger Themen erheblich ist. Beteiligt an 20 Mandatsentscheidungen zwischen 2001 und 2009, nach 19 Besuchen vor Ort, nach Begegnungen mit vielen, vielen Einsatzrückkehrern und AfghanInnen bleibe ich in Mitverantwortung, bleibt Afghanistan ein Herzensanliegen – nicht zuletzt auch deshalb, weil die allermeisten politischen Spitzenverantwortlichen für den Afghanistaneinsatz sich schon lange von Afghanistan abgewandt haben.

Da die Bundesregierung ihrer Berichtspflicht (und erst recht ihrer Evaluierungspflicht) noch unzureichender als vor zehn Jahren nachkommt und der Bundestag dies als Mitauftraggeber hinnimmt, habe ich im Vorfeld der Mandatsentscheidungen Ende 2017/Anfang 2018 wieder verstärkt Hintergrundinformationen zusammengestellt. Die Resonanz war überschaubar.

- 23.-25.11. 32. Afghanistan-Tagung in Villigst/Ruhr „“Nach 40 Jahren Krieg: Afghanistan auf der Schwelle zum Frieden?“ Impulsvortrag und Podiumsteilnahme „Gehen oder bleiben? Wie sollte  Deutschland die aktuellen Friedensbemühungen in Afghanistan unterstützen?“ (andere Referenten:  Botschafter Markus Potzel, Sonderbeauftragter der Bundesregierung für AFG + PAK, Dr. Habiba Sarabi, stv. Vorsitzende des Hohen Friedensrats AFG, ehem. Gouverneurin der Provinz Bamyan, Ramiz Bakhtiar, Youth Representative in the UN, Prof. Milad Karimi, Zentrum für Islamische Theologie Uni Münster, Mansur Faqiryar, 2011-2014 afghanischer Nationaltorhüter), 17.12.2018, http://nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&catid=36&aid=1563  

- 05.11., Konferenz „Abschiebung in ein umkämpftes Land. Die politische Zukunft Afghanistans und die deutsche Asyl- und Abschiebepolitik“, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Berlin, Teilnehmer beim Abschlusspodium (über 150 KonferenzteilnehmerInnen)

- 27.09. Vortrag „17 Jahre Afghanistaneinsatz – Ausweg Abzug? Bilanz und Perspektiven des deutschen Einsatzes in Afghanistan“ bei der Sektion Wetzlar/Lahn-Dill der Gesellschaft für Sicherheitspolitik

- 15.05. Vortrag „Afghanistan – Land ohne Hoffnung? Suche Frieden in einem unfriedlichen Land“, Ökumenischer AK der Kath. und Evang. Kirchengemeinden Lüdinghausen

- Sit-ins-, Peace Camps und Konvois: Mutige Friedensproteste in mehreren afghanischen Provinzen, 16.04.2018, http://nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&catid=36&aid=1526

- 02./03.03. Vortrag „Stand und Perspektiven des dt. Afghanistan-Engagements“ bei der 36. Jahrestagung des „Freundeskreis Afghanistan“ (FKA) in Attendorn (http://www.fk-afghanistan.de/ ) , Bilder dazu unter www.facebook.com/winfried.nachtwei )

- 12.03. „Zum neuen Afghanistan-Mandat: Realistischer und wirksamer oder endlos in der Sackgasse?“auf  (http://nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&aid=1521  ) Kurzfassung erschienen am 14.03. in „Behörden Spiegel“ Newsletter „Verteidigung – Streitkräfte – Wehrtechnik“, Nr. 203

- 22.02. UNAMA-Jahresbericht 2017 zu Zivilopfern Afghanistan: Erstmalig Rückgang allgemein, ABER Anstieg bei komplexen Angriffen, davon 70% in Kabul, und gegen religiöse Stätten; Schiiten im Daesh-Visier, 22.02.2018,

- 02.01.2018 Bundestagsdebatten zur Resolute-Support-Verlängerung/Afghanistan. Nach drei Jahren Beratungsmission in Afghanistan: Klare Sicht? Gemeinsamer Kurs? Langer Atem? Kommentar zu den Bundestagsdebatten über die Fortsetzung der deutschen Beteiligung an „Resolute Support“ am 21.11./12.12.2017, www.nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&aid=1513

- 26.12.2017  31. Afghanistan-Tagung seit 1984 in Villigst/Ruhr: Hinsehen statt Wegsehen - Mutmacher gegen die Gewaltseuche, www.nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&aid=1512

- 29.11.2017 „TRUE WARRIORS“ – Dokumentarfilm: Afghanische Künstler gegen Selbstmordattentate und Mob-Gewalt, http://nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&aid=1509

- 27.11.2017 Mein erster KABUL-Besuch vor genau 15 Jahren: Kriegszerstörungen, Aufbruchsstimmung, Friedenshoffnungen, http://nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&aid=1507

- 27.11.2017  Statt „weiter so“ im Nebel abwärts in Afghanistan: Endlich kritische Überprüfung, Realismus, strategischer Konsens und Exit-Kriterien. Anmerkungen zur Mandatsentscheidung „Resolute Support“ vom 21.11.2017, (ausführlich zur AFG-Politik unter Trump) http://nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&aid=1506

- 10.09.2017 Afghanistan: Wuchernde Fluchtursachen, einzelne Hoffnungsträger – Zur Lagebeurteilung des AA und zur deutschen Zusammenarbeit mit AFG unter Bedrohung, http://nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&aid=1495

- 19.07.2017 Weiter Höchststand an Zivilopfern in Afghanistan, „Spitzenreiter“ Kabul, Suizid- und komplexe Attacken fordern so viele Zivilopfer wie nie zuvor, UNAMA-Bericht Zivilopfer 1. Halbjahr 2017, http://nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&aid=1484

- 01.-07.06.2017 Mörderische Woche in Kabul – Mittwoch Lkw-Bombe in Rush Hour im Zentrum, Freitag Demo mit Toten, Samstag 3 Selbstmordattentäter bei Beerdigung, http://nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&aid=1475


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Vortragsangebot zu Riga-Deportationen, Ghetto Riga + Dt. Riga-Komitee

Ende 1941/Anfang 1942 rollten Deportationszüge aus Deutschland und Österreich nach Riga.

1989 stieß ich auf die Spuren der verschleppten jüdischen Frauen, Männer und Kinder.

Mit meinem bebilderten Vortrag "Nachbarn von nebenan - verschollen in Riga" stehe ich gern für Erinnerungsveranstaltungen und Schulen zur Verfügung. (Anlage)

Vorstellung der "Toolbox Krisenmanagement"

Von der zivilen Krisenprävention bis zum Peacebuilding: Die 53-seitige Broschüre stellt kompakt und klar auf jeweils einer Themenseite Prinzipien, Akteure und Instrumente des Krisenmanagements vor. Bei einem Kolloquium im Bundestag in Berlin wurde die Schrift einem Fachpublikum vorgestellt. Erstellt von AutorInnen des Zentrums Internationale Friedenseinsätze ZIF und der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik SWP ist die "Toolbox" ein wichtiger Beitrag zur friedens- und sicherheitspolitischen Grundbildung auf einem Politikfeld, wo die Analphabetenrate in der Gesellschaft, aber auch in Medien und Politik sehr hoch ist. ... www.zif-berlin.de

zif
Auf dem Foto überreicht W. Nachtwei den AutorInnen seine 2008 erschienene Broschüre zur Zivilen Krisenprävention und Friedensförderung.

Mehr zur Rolle zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure bei der zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung u.a.:

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