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Working together for a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis!

Winfried Nachtwei, Member of the German Bundestag

22 February 2003

The military build-up in the Gulf is in full swing. War appears inevitable. Eighty percent of European citizens in the EU, together with Iraq's neighbouring states and the churches, are against such a war. It must not be allowed to be inevitable.

The battle to legitimise an Iraq war is reaching fever pitch. The US administration is fighting this battle to win supporters, to win over the American and international public, strategically, and using all means possible. Experience from the run-up to the Vietnam War and the second Gulf War suggests that attempts to create a facade of legitimacy for such a war are to be expected.

Peaceful disarmament has worked

Saddam Hussein's regime is a particularly brutal dictatorship and a self-declared arch enemy of Israel. Saddam Hussein is seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and has already employed such weapons. The United Nations is thus completely right to demand that Iraq should fully disclose, and halt, its activities in the area of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Between 1991 and 1998, the UN inspectors destroyed the vast majority of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and production sites.

Over the past years, Iraq has been effectively held in check. The Federal Republic of Germany has played an active role in this process since 1991. All evidence available so far suggests that Iraq does not pose an acute threat even to its neighbours, let alone to Europe and the USA. (Compare Bernd W. Kubbig (ed.): Brandherd Irak ("Flashpoint Iraq"), 2003, extracts printed in the Frankfurter Rundschau newspaper, 11.01.2003, www.fr-aktuell.de/doku)

The presentation given by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Security Council on 5 February has done nothing to change this assessment of the situation. In his speech, he praised a British dossier, large sections of which were copied from research presented by a student, containing some information which was 12 years old. The evidence presented by the US must now be examined by the inspectors and the countries belonging to the Security Council. The US government's delay in passing on its evidence to the weapons inspectors is certainly not an example of the "full support" for UNMOVIC and IAEA, which Resolution 1441 requests from all Member States. Eleven of the fifteen foreign ministers spoke in the Security Council in favour of a continuation of the inspections.

The UN and IAEA inspectors are currently able to work more effectively in Iraq than ever before. So far, no weapons of mass destruction or production sites have been found. There is - according to the British or German intelligence services for example - still no solid evidence of links to international terrorist networks. (Were cooperation with al-Qaeda taking place, however, it would be the worst possible case scenario in terms of security policy!) Many questions concerning previously existing stocks remain unanswered. The UN inspectors are critical of Iraq's failure to cooperate actively with them, but they noted in their report of 14 February 2003 that some progress had been made. The first U-2 reconnaissance flights have now taken place. Iraq must comply fully with Resolution 1441 of the UN Security Council.

With the help of a long-term intensified weapons control regime, Iraq can be effectively monitored and disarmed. This will still apply, indeed even more so, if the weapons inspectors do in fact prove massive breaches of Resolution 1441.

The UN Security Council must remain the sole body with legitimacy to evaluate the findings of UNMOVIC and IAEA. Only the Council must be allowed to take decisions on war and peace. Military intervention on the basis of Resolution 1441 alone would drastically lower the threshold for exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations, thus undermining both international law and the UN. Such action would be extremely controversial in terms of international law. A second Security Council resolution would be politically necessary to authorise war.

War: unjustifiable and irresponsible

In a situation where peaceful means have good prospects of success, and are far from exhausted, where the USA has made clear that it is seeking regime change, an attack on Iraq is unjustifiable. Such an attack would be a "pre-emptive war" in line with the new US doctrine of "pre-emptive self-defence" and part of a new strategic direction in US global policy, which links offensive "war on terrorism" with possible "pre-emptive" war against "terrorist states". This undermines the prohibition of the use of force in international relations, it places decisions on war in the hands of the strongest, thus destroying international law.

Because of its unforeseeable consequences for the region, for international security and for the global economy, war is also irresponsible.

The pro-war faction in the US government is counting on military intervention being successful within a few weeks. This is possible, but unlikely. The war aim of regime change means a battle for Baghdad, where the US forces would only be able to exploit their technological superiority to a limited extent. The UN is reckoning with half a million wounded and dead, and several million refugees. In a society already weakened by dictatorship and economic sanctions, the number of civilian victims would be especially high. It is particularly important to stress the human consequences of intervention, since US military leaders are doing everything possible, through manipulation of media coverage, to ensure that the victims on the other side are as invisible as possible.

A war against Iraq would fuel anti-American and anti-Western sentiment, hate and violence all over the world and attract huge numbers of new supporters and fighters to international terrorism. This would be a setback in the fight against international terrorism, which is in any case already an extremely difficult and laborious one. The USA would then be exposed to the wrath not only of Islamic fundamentalism, but also of Arab nationalism. All of this would fan the flames of the battle of cultures - precisely the trap into which international Islamic terrorism wishes to lure the West.

The peace process in Afghanistan, already extremely fragile, would come under intense pressure. The security situation for the international reconstruction workers and military personnel, including the large German contingent with its leadership role, would become critical.

Even should a rapid military victory be achieved, the question as to the aftermath of war remains. Any force which seeks regime change automatically takes on responsibility for it. Since the Iraqi opposition is extremely divided and weak and there is an acute danger of Iraq disintegrating, a US military protectorate would be needed for years to come. The US public is not prepared to provide this and the necessary funds are lacking worldwide. The international community is already facing enormous problems in making headway on peace building and nation building in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. The comparison with Germany and Japan after 1945 is misleading. The idea of introducing democracy to Iraq in the aftermath of an imperial war, thus ushering in a new order throughout the Middle East, is, in view of the real hegemonic interests which exist, unconvincing and wholly illusionary. The consequence of regime change brought about by war would not be the introduction of chaos, rather than democracy to the region.

The destabilisation of Europe's neighbouring region would have direct consequences for European security. Germany might also become directly embroiled, as a result of escalations in the direction of Turkey, in Afghanistan, or involving Israel, or as a result of a worldwide terrorist offensive. Estimates of the costs of the war and its knock-on effects for the USA over the next ten years range from $100bn to $2000bn, depending on the scenario. A more drawn-out war would trigger an explosion in oil prices, leading in turn to a global recession.

Notwithstanding the discussions over the last few years with regard to the legitimacy in political and peace-ethics terms of German involvement in the Kosovo war and in the military battle against terrorism, the conclusion must be that:

The impending Iraq war is not about either legitimate self-defence, or "humanitarian intervention", or "crisis resolution". It would be a prototype of an unjustified war and would be hugely damaging to German and European security interests.

Supporters of war draw parallels with the 1930s, or even 40s. They are right in saying that aggressive dictators cannot be stopped through a policy of appeasement and that war against such dictators can in principle be legitimate where they act as aggressors and pose an acute threat. But here the parallels end. There can be no suggestion of an appeasement policy towards Iraq since 1990. On the contrary, it has since been restrained very effectively. And it is wholly ahistorical to draw parallels between Saddam Hussein today and the Nazi regime in the 1940s, with its highly modern Wehrmacht and its unparalleled programme of occupation and destruction.

To claim that the alternative to war is to do nothing is a distortion of the facts and ignores the generally successful practice of treaty-based multilateral weapons control and non-proliferation, in particular since the end of the 90s. It is the Bush administration which is withdrawing from this weapons control regime, thus weakening it.

The weaker the US administration's arguments in favour of military intervention are, the more intense and ruthless becomes the pressure exerted on Security Council members, allies and Iraq's neighbouring states, to obtain their political and logistical support, or at least their tacit acceptance. States economically, financially or militarily reliant on the USA face the threat of assistance being withdrawn. Other states are "bought off". In cases like that of Germany, where such direct blackmail is, in the first instance, less opportune, a political example is made of the state in question - as a warning to all those who might potentially step out of line. Rifts between the European states, between older and newer partners in the EU and NATO, are deliberately fostered in order to isolate Germany and France.

Such a policy shakes the very foundations of the transatlantic relationship, which was always intended to be both a partnership and a community of interests and values.

Alternatives to war

The Iraqi regime must comply fully with Resolution 1441 and cooperate actively with the weapons inspectors. Two possible ways out would be the exile of Saddam Hussein or a coup. Both of these are regarded as highly unlikely. The UMNOVIC and IAEA weapons inspectors need months, rather than weeks, to carry out their mission in a credible manner.

A long-term robust weapons control regime in Iraq is the best way of guaranteeing its effective disarmament. In order to achieve this, the number of inspectors must be increased significantly and even more effective reconnaissance capabilities (U-2 aircraft, helicopters, Luna drones, surveillance aircraft and procedures from the successful Open Skies context) used. (Compare the study: "Iraq - What Next?", published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2003, www.ceip.org/Iraq).

This should be combined with the deployment of UN human rights observers in Iraq, with targeted support for democratic forces within the Iraqi opposition and the lifting of the counterproductive and disastrous embargo.

Andrea Böhm, US correspondent for the taz newspaper for many years, believes that the threat of military attacks is vital to ensure the success of the weapons control regime (taz, 03.02.03). It is obvious that the threat of war issuing from the USA has made the work of the inspectors considerably easier. But the clear lesson learnt from the Kosovo crisis is that those who issue threats must be prepared to implement them, with all the consequences that entails. They must thus examine whether the threats are responsible, rather than merely counting on bluff being effective.

The existing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction must be made more effective, not only with regard to Iraq. It is the USA itself which is blocking a control regime in the area of biological weapons.

The fight against international terrorism and the resolution of regional conflicts must be given priority. Bringing under control and finding a settlement for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of key importance. An Iraq war would turn these priorities on their head.

German position, responsibility and non-participation

The German SPD-Greens government spoke out against an Iraq war earlier and more unequivocally than any comparable government. This position goes back to a Bundestag resolution of November 2001, where the idea of including Iraq in the battle against terrorism with military means was rejected. (Compare the article by Gunter Hofmann: Der lange Weg zum lauten Nein - "The long way to a loud 'no'" in Die Zeit newspaper, 23.01.2003). Joschka Fischer, a proponent of realpolitik and expert on the Middle East, has rejected a war against Iraq. Since February 2002, I have been able to witness personally, both in public and especially behind the scenes, how fundamental and strategic this rejection is.

The German anti-war position was, and continues to be, of great international significance. It represents, like no other government position, the anti-war stance of European civil society and others. Categorical statements during the election campaign had an influence on the masses. At the same time, however, they restricted Germany's diplomatic room for manoeuvre, in particular with regard to a joint European position. Here, the traditional lack of unity within the EU with regard to Iraq persisted. The discordant governments of Europe withdrew to the wings, leaving things to the US political establishment.

As a member of the UN Security Council, and its chair in February, the Federal Government bears a central part of the responsibility for working towards the permanent disarmament of Iraq and towards a peaceful solution. In this, the authority of the UN as the sole body with the legitimacy to decide on war and peace must be preserved and, at the same time, damage to the transatlantic relationship, European integration and Germany's position vis-à-vis its partners limited. The Federal Government has clearly stated that the stance it adopts and the vote it casts will be in line with these fundamental positions. This is a matter of basic credibility.

At the same time, it has guaranteed the USA full freedom of movement on German territory and the protection of its sites. Naturally, in view of Germany's political commitments towards its largest Alliance partner this is the only possible stance. It would, however, develop into an awkward problem were a US military intervention in Iraq to contravene international law. Were Germany to go beyond its refusal to become involved and actively hinder its allies the USA and the UK, their military deployment and supply activities would be significantly impeded. This would shake the very foundations of the transatlantic partnership and NATO. A way must therefore be found which avoids a breach of either international law or Alliance commitments.

There has been no change to the position that the Bundeswehr contingents in Enduring Freedom, in particular the six NBC reconnaissance vehicles in Kuwait and the naval ships in the Horn of Africa, may only be employed in line with their terms of deployment. Thus their deployment in the framework of an attack on Iraq has been politically ruled out. Increasing the number of NBC personnel stationed in Kuwait from the current 60 (a maximum of 800 is permitted under the Bundestag resolution) would do nothing to change this.

The reinforcement of the German ISAF forces in Kabul does not represent burden sharing with regard to Iraq. It was made necessary by the situation on the ground. The USA is not involved in ISAF. (In the event of a worst case scenario where it had to be evacuated, the large Bundeswehr contingent would, however, be wholly dependent on US assistance. This means that Germany is reliant on the USA on a matter of life and death and thus also susceptible to pressure.)

Requests for active support (military police, regional missile defence, NBC defence capabilities) have been rejected. Had the Federal Government demonstrated a willingness to take part in a war, it might have been asked to provide more - such as ECR Tornados, which Germany contributed during the Kosovo air war. The line on AWACS aircraft is clear: they may only be used for air surveillance over the NATO area. Targeting and fire control tasks are taboo. Anything other than air surveillance would constitute the deployment of armed forces outside the NATO area, thus requiring a Bundestag resolution. The Federal Government has also refused to contribute anything towards the costs of a war. In 1991, Germany provided around 18bn Deutschmarks.

A problematic grey zone arises with regard to Turkey and the provision of Patriot air defence missiles and NBC defence units: for weeks, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg postponed a decision on this issue in the NATO Council, in order to avoid sending the wrong signal. The green light has now been given for the internal NATO planning process to begin, with the clear proviso that this only relates to the defence of Turkey and is without prejudice to other operations and decisions. Germany is providing Turkey with Patriot missiles, whilst the systems and crews to operate them are to come from the Netherlands. The basic position which applies is that support will be provided within the framework of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but not for an attack on Iraq. The issue of support for Turkey is evidently not primarily about taking precautions to protect against a real threat, but rather about large-scale power games, aimed at embarrassing those allies working towards a peaceful solution to the Iraq conflict.

The refusal to provide military personnel, equipment and funding for an Iraq war is of the highest political importance and should not be played down, as it has been by the opposition and sections of the peace movement..

During the election campaign, however, expectations were at times raised Germany could simply withdraw from its legal and political commitments within NATO as it saw fit. The fact is, however, that while a Germany which - fortunately - is, and must remain, closely embedded in multilateral networks, is naturally allowed to have its own positions, a "German way", a decision to go it alone, or an absolute "count-me-out" stance is not possible. German unilateralism would - regardless of the motives for it - soon be regarded by its European neighbours as a threat.

Germany's isolation within the EU and NATO would be a blow to European integration, would boost centrifugal forces, dramatically reduce the Germany's political influence and damage fundamental German interests.

It is not easy to assess the danger of isolation realistically, without either overdramatising or playing it down. It is wrong to react to the opposition’s rhetoric by denying that this danger exists. And it is short-sighted to weigh up possible German marginalisation and isolation at government level against the broad international acceptance of the German position within society, thus concluding that this isolation is acceptable. International relations are about the building of trust, the ability to cooperate, about power, influence and the wide range of ensuing consequences.

Attempts to assess the risks of isolation are complicated by the time factor. At the beginning of February these risks appeared considerable. But with the joint declaration issued by France, Germany and Russia, the tables were turned. Since the meetings of the Security Council which took place on 14 February, and afterwards, and the mass demonstrations all over the world, it has been the pro-war governments, beginning with Tony Blair, who have begun to suffer unprecedented isolation. The anti-French and anti-European sentiments deliberately fuelled by many sections of the media and politicians are a cause for concern.

If it wants to be involved in discussions and negotiations on the black ice of diplomatic relations, the Federal Government, and the Federal Foreign Minister, who is responsible for the concrete implementation of peace policy, require room for manoeuvre. Detailed commitments to future courses of action are thus not sensible, in view of the many unknown factors. It is something completely different, and wholly legitimate, however, to have expectations and make demands of the Federal Government.

Conservative opposition

For weeks now, the CDU/CSU and the FDP have been fiercely attacking the anti-war stance of the SPD and Greens, playing down the risks of war and keeping open the possibility of German support for a war. By discrediting any criticism of the Bush administration as “anti-Americanism” and beating those who step out of line with the “Alliance stick”, they are providing support for the American war faction.

The opposition is cooperating in this with those sections of the media which are keen to damage the credibility of the SPD and Greens for domestic policy reasons and evidently interested in seeing the coalition topple from the tightrope it is attempting to walk.

Having initially concentrated its criticism of the Federal Government on procedural questions and the government's handling of relations, whilst avoiding the key question of whether it was “for” or “against” war in Iraq, the CDU/CSU has now, since the elections at Land level, “swung” clearly towards a “Bush course” (c.f. Süddeutsche Zeitung of 7.2). At the Munich Conference on Security Policy, CDU Chairwoman Angela Merkel declared the CDU/CSU’s support for military action against Saddam Hussein, stating that the Bundeswehr should be involved in such action.

Christian Schmidt, defence policy spokesman for the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, recently called on the Federal Government to relinquish its position as chair of the Security Council because of its “rigid anti-war stance”. In doing so, Schmidt is not only expressing his support for a flexible position on war, he is also openly sabotaging German attempts to find a peaceful solution. Politicians from the CDU/CSU are particularly fond of talking about “German interests”. Yet they obviously do not care about these when party political interests are at stake.

It is important to remember that when CDU/CSU politicians express their sympathy for US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s attacks on the Federal Government, the same political forces are cooperating as in the 80s. At that time, the Reagan administration provided massive support for Iraq in its war against Iran. Donald Rumsfeld was one of those who played a key role in this. German firms, with tacit support from the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government, made central contributions to the development of weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missiles in Iraq. And both were involved in the grand appeasement of Iraq when it employed chemical weapons against Iran and its own people.

Opposition to a war against Iraq extends well into the ranks of CDU/CSU supporters. The policy of the CDU/CSU leadership is dishonest, opportunistic and dangerous. We must ensure that this is highlighted more clearly.

Allies and mutual support

A global battle is currently underway with regard to the legitimacy of an Iraq war. If peace policy is to have any chance at all, and be able to hold its own against the powerful war faction and its threat potential, there is a need for political alternatives to the war course (see above), for the largest possible number of allies and the widest possible support, at both international and domestic level. Neither governments nor the anti-war movement can be successful on their own. Governments and social protest need each other.

According to a Gallup poll conducted in 41 countries, no majority exists anywhere in favour of military action against Baghdad in the absence of a UN mandate. Even intervention with a mandate would only gain a majority in a few countries.

The 53 heads of state and government of the African Union have clearly stated their opposition to an Iraq war. The position of the churches, from the Pope down, is clearer and more unanimous than ever before. On 5 February, twenty Protestant and Orthodox church leaders, including the representatives of 50 million believers in the USA, put their names to an unprecedented appeal against an Iraq war. The Australian Senate passed a motion of no-confidence in Prime Minister John Howard after he sent troops to the Gulf without informing parliament. (So far, only the USA, the UK and Australia are directly involved in the military build-up to war against Iraq. The allied Alliance in the 2^nd Gulf War, in contrast, encompassed 30 states and 680,000 troops.)

Never before have the people in Europe been so united on a foreign policy issue as in their opposition to an Iraq war. This united Europe united visibly with the historic demonstrations of 15 February, overcoming "from the bottom up" the division provoked by eight heads of state and government against the will of their own people. Millions of Europeans helped to bring about a joint declaration at the EU special summit, which emphasised the primacy of peaceful disarmament of Iraq and called for more time and resources for the inspectors. The Europeans have every reason for self-confidence vis-à-vis a hyperpower "which is so bursting with military muscle that it can barely walk and which sees itself and the world as having been in a permanent state of emergency since the 11^th of September" (A. Böhm, see above). The so-called "Euroweenies" play the leading role worldwide in the tasks of conflict containment, peace building and nation building, which are by no means "soft options". (The EU provides ten times as many troops for peacekeeping missions as the USA. 55% of world development aid comes from the EU, etc.)

In Germany, following the churches' clear statements of position, broad alliances are being forged within society against an Iraq war and in favour of peace and disarmament in the Middle East. The anti-war protest extends far beyond the heterogeneous peace movement, with its now small groups of supporters. This is the first time ever that an anti-war and peace movement in Germany has experienced its own government not as an opponent, but as a receptive listener. In contrast to the division of roles which existed for years between the opposition protest movement and the government, it is now vital to concentrate fully on finding a peaceful resolution to the Iraq crisis and the Middle East crisis and defending international law against the proponents of "pre-emptive war" and to provide support to the Federal Government in these endeavours - although not, of course, uncritically or unconditionally. What is important now is not for the peace movement's most radical demands (e.g. withdrawal from Enduring Freedom) to be met, or the most radical of anti-war and "count-me-out" statements (such as the counterproductive campaign by the German Peace Society - United War Resisters, encouraging people to file complaints against the Federal Government) to gain acceptance. Likewise, claims to leadership, or even to sole representation, are also not what is required. What is needed is cooperation across a wide political spectrum, extending into the ranks of CDU/CSU and FDP supporters. Compare the open letter from prominent public figures to the leaders of the German Bishops' Conference, the Council of the Protestant Church in Germany, the German Trade Union Federation and the Confederation of German Employers' Associations, in the Frankfurter Rundschau newspaper, 03.02.2003. What counts now is to pursue peace policy as effectively as possible, in the face of the most acute threat of war. The biggest peace demonstration in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany achieved this in an impressive manner.

There are differences in the room for manoeuvre enjoyed by the peace and protest movements, the parties, the parliamentary groups of parties in governing coalitions and governments, for example as regards to the freedom of movement of US forces in Germany; this is something against which demonstrators, viewing it as preparation for an Iraq war, can rightly protest, whilst, for the Federal Government, it is a delicate issue with potentially explosive consequences for foreign policy (see above).

Many of those who became divided during the debates on the Kosovo and Afghanistan wars now have the opportunity to come together again. Yet Alliance 90/The Greens do not support these peace activities as a kind of restitution for alleged "government sins", or as a return to the pacifism and peace movement of the early days. The involvement of Alliance 90/The Greens arises from their foreign and peace policies, aimed at preventing and containing war in the interests of common security, and based on the principle that military means can only be justified under clearly defined conditions and within the framework of the UN Charter.

The USA as a receptive listener and partner

All appeals for and efforts towards peace must be aimed at the US public and the "other America". It is only public opinion in the USA, rather than important allies, or the Pope, which seems to still hold sway with the war faction in the US government. The decisive factor will be whether a way can be found for President Bush to step back from war without losing face.

We will only find receptive listeners if we avoid any kind of generalisation or anti-Americanism and formulate all criticism of US policy both clearly and precisely. We do not confuse the hawks and the war faction with the USA as a whole. We are aware of the diversity which exists in America and the fierce criticism being expressed by the "other America" against its own government. We know how much the Europeans, the Germans in particular, have to thank the USA for and that it was the USA which provided the initial impetus for the United Nations. We are aware that the Balkan wars were only extinguished with the help of the USA. We know that we can only meet the major global challenges in cooperation with the USA. This is precisely why we are seeking support amongst our American friends for a peaceful solution to the Iraq conflict and against a withdrawal by their government from the transatlantic community of values.

Alliance 90/The Greens should speak, act and demonstrate with these considerations in mind. And it is with these considerations in mind that we should contact all our acquaintances, friends, twin communities and partner organisations in the USA, but also in the UK, Spain, Central and South-Eastern Europe, by e-mail, fax and telephone and, most importantly, speak to them. Dialogue is essential. Mutual monologues merely evolve into dialogues of the deaf.